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Article 12(3) of Regulation (EEC) No  1553/891 states that "the Commission shall 
produce a report every three years on the procedures applied in the Member States 
and on any improvements contemplated". 
This report is the third one produced by the Commission: the first was published in 
1992 and the second in 1995.2 
In  recent  years,  the  various  authorities  which  deal  with  VAT  management 
procedures have focused their attention in particular on the problems connected with 
the activities of  controlling and combating fraud. 
The interests at stake are very important: VAT is the main source of  revenue for the 
Community budget, although its'relative share is falling steadily.  It also represents 
one of  the most important sources of  revenue for the Member States.  It was already 
stressed in the second report that a revenue shortfall and, therefore, a shortfall of  the 
VAT resource, .  had  to  be offset by an  additional call on the  GNP  resource,  thus 
altering the relative shares of the VAT and the GNP resources.  The additional call 
on the GNP resource is financed by all the Member States.  Lack of efficiency in 
collecting VAT in just one Member State has an impact on the other Member States. 
The Member States and the Commission are therefore obliged to pay close attention 
to the developm~nt of fraud, and to promote measures to improve and enhance the 
prevention of  and the fight against tax fraud. 
No categorical conclusions can be drawn on tax  fraud  - in  particular in  terms of 
quantity - but the information available does nevertheless give some clue as to the 
scale and importance of  fraud  .•  and indicates certain general principles fqr combating 
it. 
After a brief survey of  the basic features of  VAT fraud today, the report summarises 
the experiences and the basic principles underlying control systems and describes 
how they are moving towards finding solutions which will improve and enhance the 
methods  of combating  a  problem  which  attacks  the  very  integrity  of the  VAT 
system at Community and national levels. 
In  dealing  with  the  VAT  collection  and  control  procedures  applied  in  the 
Member States,  this  report  takes  account of a  wide  range of work  and  activities 
which have been carried out by various bodies. 
Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1553/89 of  29 May 1989, OJ L 155 pp 9-13, 7.12.1989. 
The first  report (SEC(92)280 final)  was produced in  February 1992; the second (COM(95)354 final) 
was published in July 1995. Of  these activities, the main sources for drafting this report have been: 
1.  the  VAT seminars  organised  by  the  Commission3  in  response  to  the  Second 
Article 12  Report recommendations on setting up special programmes to  tackle 
the  most  relevant  risks;  their  conclusions  are  given  in  detail  in  the  specific 
working document; 
2.  the  work  of the  Committees  provided  for  by  Regulation  (EEC)  No 219/924 
(SCAC and SCAF); 
3.  the seminars organised under the Matthaeus Tax programme.5 





Any reference to combating fraud implies that at least basic information is available 
concerning the problem facing the national supervisory services.  But, in the case of 
tax  fraud,  it is first  necessary to  clarify the coverage of the word "fraud", mainly 
because of the different definitions used in the Member States6 and difficulties of a 
linguistic nature (one example will  suffice:  "evasion" in  English indicates illegal 
non-payment of tax,  whereas "evasion" in  French corresponds to  "avoidance" in 
English). 
In this report, fraud means any activity which, in direct breach of the law or through 
unlawful abuse of  such standards, leads to a deliberate evasion of  proper compliance 
with tax obligations, and consequently, to  the non-taxation of any taxable amount 
and/or to non-payment of  tax. 
Since tax systems are generally based on a number of  obligations (registration of  the 
taxable person, keeping of accounts,  invoicing, returns, etc.),  the main purpose of 
which  is  to  prevent  fraudulent  behaviour  (potential  or probable),  the  form  and 
content of  tax fraud differs and its seriousness varies widely, from the simple failure 
to  comply  with  formal  obligations  to  criminal  acts  of "suppression",  forgery, 
concealment, etc. 
"VAT  control  and  audit  procedures  in  high  risk  sectors"  (construction,  retail  trade,  hotels, 
restaurants, cafes), Helsinki, 8 and 9 June  1995; "Control and audit problems in  the car sector", 
Brussels,  11  and  12 December 1995; "VAT collection and control of phoenix companies, shadow 
companies,  and  companies  involved  in  the  use  of contrived  insolvencies",  Vienna,  13  and 
14 June 1996. 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 218/92 of 27  January 1992, OJ L 24,  1 February 1992.  Article  10(1) 
provides  that  the  Commission  shall  be  assisted  by  a  Standing  Committee  on  Administrative 
Cooperation in  the field -of Indirect Taxation (SCAC) within which an "Anti-Fraud Sub-Committee" 
(SCAF) has been established to  deal more directly with questions connected with  tax fraud  and the 
fight against such fraud. 
In particular the following Matthaeus Tax seminars: 
"VAT control and the textile sector", Crawley, United Kingdom, October 1995; 
"Computer audit for VAT control", Malmo, Sweden, February 1996; 
"Invoice control and invoice-related fraud", Madrid, Spain, December 1996; 
"Planning VAT control and audit", Luxembourg, September 1997. 
See Annex 16 to the Second Article 12 Report. 
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Leaving  aside  cases  of petty  irregularities  or  errors  (which  nevertheless,  taken 
together, can generate substantial tax losses for the Treasury), the following 
paragraphs concentrate on the activities which are designed to  obtain an improper 
tax advantage (by the unlawful diminution of  the taxable amount). 
Because of the way VAT actually works, we find  that  fraud  is  generally aimed at 
reducing or suppressing  the  tax  owed on sales  and/or at  increasing or creating  a 
deductible tax on purchases, so as to "distort" the final (debit or credit) tax balance. 
2.1  Fraud types 
The  methods  of  achieving  fraudulent  results  may  be  fairly  simple,  e.g.  the 
non-invoicing of sales or the deduction of non-deductible purchases, but may also 
be  the  result of more complex  activities  (creation of false  tax  subjects,  abuse of 
special taxation schemes, abuse of the rules of international trade, etc.), or may even 
involve several taxable persons, as in cases of"carousel" frauds. 
According to  the  inforn1ation  available,  in  particular the  study carried  out by the 
Anti-Fraud Sub-Committee (SCAF),? the following points can be made about VAT 
fraud: 
I. The principles underlying the transitional arrangements (in particular the exempt 
movement  of goods  in  intra-Community  trade)  have  facilitated  or  increased 
certain types of fraud.  The three special sets of arrangements under which tax is 
levied  at  the  place  of destination  (new  cars,  distance  sales,  .purchases  by 
non-taxable  legal  persons  and  exempt  taxable  persons)  are  also  complex  and 
difficult to monitor;  this opens the way for abuse or types of fraud which did not 
previously exist. 
2.  the most frequent types of fraud are the "suppression" of  output tax and the abuse 
of deduction rules,  in  their simplest and most direct  forms  (in the SCAF study 
they account for 57% of the sample concerned).  On the sales side, this fraud is 
represented by failure to  issue invoices, no  registration of sales, non-payment of 
the  invoiced VAT; on the purchases side,  the  most frequent  fraud  is  deduction 
without any evidence of an invoice (increase in the deductible VAT declared) and 
deduction  by  use  of falsified  invoices;  the  latter  fraud  uses  a  wide  range  of 
mechanisms,  with  fraudsters  continually  seeking  new  control-proof  systems: 
falsified  invoices  of  true  companies  (copies,  composite  photographs,  etc.), 
creation of invoices from non-existent suppliers and for fictitious goods, creation 
of invoices  from  genuine  suppliers  who  know  nothing  about  the  transaction, 
double use of  the same invoices appropriately amended, etc.; 
3. the types of fraud which generate the highest amounts of  evaded tax for each case 
are those which are referred to  in this report as "major organised fraucf' i.e.: 
The SCAF has. Inter aha, carried out a full study on VAT fraud in Europe.  It co\·ers 479 fraud cases 
(chosen by the Member States from among the most important in  tem1s of amounts evaded and fraud 
mechanisms) representing in total evaded tax of E(U 573 million.  The examination of these cases is 
particularly detailed and it  is  based on several parameters ( mformation on the  taxable person,  fraud 
types and mechanism-,, detectiOn method, cooperation. etc) which give a significant overview. 
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(a)  the creation of bogus companies or entities (which are known by a variety of 
names8)  with the sole aim of evading the tax  due by means of a  variety of 
mechanisms (creation of new companies which operate lawfully but which 
disappear before the  first  date for  submitting returns and paying the tax, or 
after obtaining refunds on the basis of fictitious activities or false documents, 
the disposal of assets before contriving insolvency to escape the payment of 
taxes, the creation of  customers/suppliers to simulate transactions, etc.); such 
false tax subjects are found at both domestic and international level; 
(b) "carousel" fraud, in which commercial transactions are carried out by a chain 
of companies (real or fictitious) with a view to obtaining, for each company 
involved,  a  number of improper VAT  advantages  (improper  deduction or 
refund) and, at the same time, covering the tracks of goods (real or fictitious) 
which are finally declared for export but which in reality are sold on the black 
market.  These  types  of  fraud  are  connected  with  international  and 
intra-Community trade for two main reasons: 
(i)  the system of taxation at  destination enables fraudsters  to  take 
advantage  of the  exemption  from  VAT  for  intra-Community 
supplies or for exports; 
(ii)  the  greater difficulties  of the  tax  administrations  in  detecting 
fraudulent schemes "organised" abroad. 
4. some of  the other most frequent types of fraud are: 
(a)  failure to register (the administration is unaware of  the activity conducted and 
it therefore forms part of  the underground economy); 
(b)  application of  the wrong VAT rates; 
(c)  the abuse of intra-Community and import/export rules; 
(d)  contrived  insolvencies (a company disposes of its  assets before  going into 
insolvency to escape payment of  VAT due). 
5.  limited  to  the  sample  studied  by  the  SCAF,  other  interesting  inferences,  in 
particular for control and risk analysis (see Chapter 3), can be drawn; 
(a)  a very small percentage of traders were totally unknown to the tax auth~rities 
(traders not identified for VAT) at the time when the fraud was detected; 
(b)  the (voluntary) deregistration of taxable persons is  often close to the year of 
fraud; 
(c)  almost  half the  taxable  persons  involved  in  carousel  fraud  or  fictitious 
companies were registered after 1992; 
(d)  most of the  taxable persons had less than 5 employees and 20% were sole 
traders. 
A variety of names are used to describe this type of company which is created for fraudulent ends but 
which at  the  same  time  has  to  look  like  a  normal  company:  phoenix companies,  front  companies, 
ghost companies, taxi companies, dormant companies, filter companies, letter-box companies, etc. 
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2.2  The risk sectors 
Since fraud is an activity which is continually adapting to the different situations in 
which it operates and which always tries to take advantage of  new ones, it appears in 
many guises.  Fraud mechanisms change and adapt in response to several factors, 
such as  the  sector  involved  (construction,  clothing  and  textiles,  motor car sales, 
hotels/restaurants/cafes), the type of activity (production, retailing or wholesaling, 
services, large-scale distributive trades, etc.), and the legal designation and nature of 
the  taxable person.9  Nevertheless,  it  is possible to  identify certain  sectors  which 
seem to be more exposed to the risk of  fraud. 
The construction industry is considered to be a high-risk sector, because of its size 
and the  mobility of traders,  which make it difficult to  control.  One of the main 
features of the  construction industry, which includes the  maintenance of property 
and all other activities complementary to construction, is  the failure to register and 
the  suppression  of the  tax  on  supplies  of goods  and  services,  in  particular  by 
individual  small  or micro  firms  whose  customers  are  private  individuals.  Three 
methods have been developed to camouflage receipts and undeclared turnover: 
•  work "in the black" which is attractive to customers who are not taxable persons 
because of the price discount offered (generally tempting for customers who in 
any case are not entitled to apply for VAT refunds); 
•  manipulation  by  means  of  subcontractors  (including  falsified  invoices  for 
fictitious  transactions,  non-itemised  or  non-transparent  invoices,  use  of 
subcontractors by non-resident companies without registering for VAT); 
•  manipulation  by  means  of the  equipment  used  and  the  prices  charged  (e.g. 
discounts on purchases not recorded in the accounts, fictitious inventories, claims 
and thefts). 
The  non-declaration  of sales  and  the  suppression  of the  corresponding  VAT  is 
frequent throughout the retail trade, in which there are a large number of traders, a 
huge  number  of  small  transactions,  cash  payments,  and  customers  who  are 
particularly sensitive to the final price, irrespective of  the VAT.  But the situation is 
not the same throughout the category: distinctions have to be drawn on the basis, for 
example, of the vendor's sales structure (large stores .or small shops) or the type of 
goods  (goods  for.  which  the  purchasers  ask  for  the  sale  to  be  recorded  or for  a 
supporting document for non-tax reasons, such as being eligible for the guarantee). 
A widespread fraud in the retail trade consists of the manipulation of rates: this type 
of fraud is particularly pronounced in the "HORECA" sector (HOtels, REstaurants, 
CAfes), especially in the Member States which apply different rates for supplies of 
goods (take away  meals) and supplies of services (meals consumed in  situ).  The 
failure to keep accounts in particular concerns itinerant traders, seasonal trade and 
the trade in second-hand cars. 
The wholesale trade  is  particularly exposed to  "major organised  fraud"  (false tax 
subjects,  carousel  fraud,  etc.) because its  purpose  is  to  provide  goods  which  are 
"tax-free" and consequently at more competitive prices on the market.  These frauds 
are sometimes on a very large scale and can even cause real distortions of 
The decision-making  process of an individual  firm  differs  from  that of a  public  limited  company 
which has management and supervisory departments within its structure). 
5 competition.  Some very important cases at Community level have been detected in 
the  following  sectors:  wholesaling  of meat  and  live  animals,  textiles,  portable 
telephones, audio-visual equipment and motor vehicles, and electronic components, 
which are very high value added, easily transportable goods. 
Motor car sales are particularly vulnerable to  fraud.  The differences between VAT 
rates  and  prices  on  the  national  markets,  and  the  relatively  high  level  of the 
investment for purchasers, make it worthwhile for fraudsters to devise schemes with 
the  aim of shifting  the  place of taxation.  The sector is  also  affected by  serious 
carousel fraud (three refunds of  VAT on the same vehicle" can be enough to cover its 
total cost). 
3.  CONTROL 
3.1  Background and definition 
The Member States' various control systems stem from different experiences and a 
variety  of  factors  such  as  organisation10  and  administrative  procedures,  the 
legislative framework,11  technical  equipment,  the  structure of the Member States' 
economic and social fabric, etc. 
Nevertheless  the  experiences  of the  Member States  in  control  mean  that  certain 
general  principles  can  be  identified  which  should  guide  them  in  their  efforts  to 
improve the  effectiveness of control  methods and to  adapt their procedures more 
closely to a rapidly evolving situation. 
The activities taken into account in this report are not merely verification procedures 
as such (on-site inspection, investigations, etc.), but cover a broader range of earlier 
activities (prevention, risk analysis, planning, setting of  priorities and other activities 
designed to  increase the level of voluntary compliance), and subsequent activities 
(actual recovery of the  adjusted tax,  which is  the natural corollary of control and 
fundamental for guaranteeing the deterrent effect, and evaluation of  the performance 
of  administrative action). 
3.2  Control: a basic deterrent to fraud 
The obligation  to  pay  tax  has  always  conflicted  with  the  individual's interest  in 
being able to  keep as much as  possible of the income and wealth produced by his 
work net of taxes,  in  an eternal opposition between the interests of taxpayers and 
those of the tax  authorities.  ·But today, a broadly accepted principle in relation to 
10  Some Member States have integrated their VAT control functions with those of other taxes or closely 
aligned them on those taxes, e.g.  direct taxes, taxes collected by means of assessment books, excise 
and customs duties  This .:an facilitate the detection of any VAT fraud that stems from fraud in other 
sectors.  The  admmistration  of VAT  is  increasingly  integrated  with  that  of direct  taxes  in  most 
Member States, as mdicated in the earlier Article 12 reports. 
11  The  current  system  is  marked  by  wide  differences  in  the  application  of the  VAT  rules  in  the 
Member States. 
6 taxation  is  that  the  key  purpose  of every  tax  system  is  to  promote  voluntary 
compliance12 with tax obligations, namely self-assessment, declaration and correct 
payment of the tax without first being subject to administrative control.  The basic 
idea is the existence of an implicit "contract" under which the taxable person pays 
his taxes and the State provides quality services, including the efficient detection of 
taxable persons who do not comply with their obligations. 
The  decision  to  commit  fraud  can  be  partly  but  not  exclusively  related  to  the 
likelihood of  detection,  13  i.e. the nature and severity of sanctions.  In any event, tax 
control, or rather the risk of a tax control, remains a fundamental deterrent in order 
to maintain an acceptable level of  compliance with tax obligations and consequently 
of  revenue. 
If the problems of tax fraud are to be approached properly the possibility of being 
detected must therefore become a "virtual certainty" and control procedures must be 
reliable and effective (and accompanied by really fair and  deterrent penalties14  and 
by efficient and rapid disputes procedures). 
Faced with a very large population of taxable persons, a growing number of  returns, 
and limited resources, the authorities have to select those taxable persons which are 
to be controlled.  This involves two stages: 
1.  first,  an acceptable rate of coverage for inspections must be decided (percentage 
of taxable persons  inspected  during the  reference  period).  What  must not  be 
allowed to happen is for verifications to be reduced to perfunctory, purely formal 
controls as  a result of an  increase in their frequency  (e.g.  to  inspect all taxable 
persons every two  years).15  Such a system  would  sharply reduce the deterrent 
12  It  must  be  pointed  out  that  the  recqnunendations  which  follow  will  not  fill  all  the  gaps  in  the 
frequently very complex mechanisms of the VAT system and that only new VAT arrangements based 
on  the  principles  set  out  in  the  Conunission's work  programme  {A  common system of VAT - a 
progranune  for  the  single  market  (COM(96)  328  final))  will  significantly  improve  voluntary 
compliance with obligations and the controllability of the system. 
13  In fact,  a variety of complex factors  influence the  non-compliance decision.  For example, from an 
economic point of  view, the amount which might possibly be involved, in the future, if this fraud were 
detected  determines  whether  the  inunediate  benefit  of the  fraud  is  acceptable.  Other obstacles  to 
voluntary compliance  may be  the  general  pressure of taxation,  the  complexity and fairness  of the 
taxation  system,  the  relations  between  the  tax  authorities  and  taxable  persons,  the  weaknesses  of 
control and s~nctions, and the perception of how the public authorities use taxes. 
14  The  Matthaeus  Tax  seminar  "Sanctions  applicable  in  the  field  of  VAT",  Viterbo,  Italy, 
December 1996, stressed the role of the system of sanctions (which should be flexible, effective and 
proportionate) in order to encourage taxpayers to fulfil their obligations spontaneously. 
15  The problem is  more complex since it concerns the general principles underlying the control system 
and in particular the methods of control adopted.  The average length of an  inspection and therefore 
the number of them, assuming that there is  no change in the  resources available, is heavily influenced 
by whether or not they are  combined with the control of direct taxes,  the  period taken into account 
(one or more years), the thoroughness of checks, the physical controls of stocks, accounting analyses, 
formal controls, and so on.  This is why some Member States have developed flexible procedures with 
the  aim  of optimising  the  use  of resources  by  tailoring  the  method  and  the  thoroughness  of the 
inspection to the particular case. 
7 effect of  the inspection, in particular as regards frauds which can be detected only 
by more thorough inspections; 
2.  Once  the  number  of taxable  persons  to  be  controlled  has  been  decided,  it  is 
necessary  to  determine  those  who  should  actually  be  controlled  and  which 
priority should  be used.  The better the  choice, the more effective the control 
action will be:  traders must be made to  feel  that it is "virtually certain" that the 
fraud will be detected.  The choice is mainly influenced by risk analysis which, 
by defining certain tax "risk" indicators,  allows the administration to  target its 
efforts and define control priorities. 
Moreover,  the effectiveness of the control is  not  measured solely  in  tenns of the 
number of taxable  persons  actually  controlled,  but  also  by  its  multiplier  effect: 
traders  who  follow  the  rules  are  bound  to  welcome a  control  which restores  the 
fairness of taxation and the conditions of fair competition, which are upset by fraud; 
fraudsters (and potential new fraudsters from the same sector, or the same region or 
town) will become more aware of the vigilance exercised by the authorities and the 
risk that their frauds will be detected.  This explains why an accurate evaluation of 
the effectiveness of control should go beyond the mere sums involved in the fraud 
detected and attempt to take account of  the deterrent effect. 
Several  national  administrations  widely  publicise  their  control  activity  and  in 
particular the results obtained. 
In  conclusion,  the  Commission  feels  that  in  the  present  situation  all  the 
administrations of the  Member States must  undertake  to  attain  the  following  two 
objectives: 
•  to maximise voluntary compliance with tax obligations; 
•  to  enhance  the  deterrent  effect  of control,  which  means  increasing  the 
perception that fraud is "virtually certain" to be detected; the key elements 
in  this  objective  are the  selection  of taxable persons on  the  basis  of risk 
parameters, and the multiplier effect of action which is genuinely and visibly 
effective and efficient. 
3.3  The management of control 
3.3.1  Risk analysis 
The purpose of risk analysis is  to  detennine the indicators which can improve the 
targeting of controls and to  put them in order of priority.  The Member States are 
making increasing use of risk analysis and of the other analytical techniques which 
enable them to  determine in  advance where  fraud  is  most  likely  to  be  found  and 
therefore to establish an order of priority for control activities. 
This means the systematic and organised collection of  all available infonnation so as 
to  determine the  general reference  framework  and  the risk  indicators.  As  regards 
sectors,  analysis  is  based  on  macroeconomic  data  (markets,  commercial  flows, 
imports, etc.),  refined  and  completed by data concerning the  traders  in  the sector 
(size, organisation, net worth, turnover, economic and financial situation, etc.).  It is 
8 desirable  to  have  an  overall  assessment  of the  risks  at  the  same  level  of fraud 
(regional, local, etc.) so as to target the use of resources in the most effective way. 
The  analysis  can  also  be  completed  by  any  other  information:  registration, 
examination of tax  returns, control  results,  16  cross-checking of tax  data with that 
from other sources (professional associations, social security organisations), etc. 
The dissemination of results to  the peripheral  levels  and/or the inspection offices 
enables the detailed information available for individuals to  be supplemented: as  a 
rule, any information directly or indirectly concerning each taxable person should be 
collected  and  kept  in  an  individual  file  established  by  that  person's  inspecting 
department. 
Inspection results are certainly the most important source of information since - in 
particular in the case of VAT - irregularities concerning transactions are bound to 
have repercussions for suppliers and customers (taxable persons).  Other important 
facts  at  individual  level  may be  refund  requests,  the particulars on  recapitulative 
statements  of intra-Community  trade,  licences  and  administrative  authorisations, 
newspaper announcements and publicity offers, etc. 
When  establishing risk  elements  the  attention  of tax  inspectors  is  also  drawn  to 
certain points deserving special vigilance, such as: 
•  trading  activity  in  high  value  added,  easily  transportable  goods  (electronic 
components), or in sectors where there is a high likelihood of  carousel fraud; 
•  companies generating huge  sales  after only  a  short  period  of trading  or only 
reduced or non-existent activity, and ceasing to trade just as suddenly; 
•  companies  declaring  a  high  level  of sales,  but  without  the  corresponding 
production facilities.  In this case, as in the previous one, it can be assumed that 
these activities are entirely bogus, but result in the issue of invoices which their 
clients will use to obtain an unjustified VAT deduction or refund;  17 
•  companies managed by persons with the profile of  men of  straw (persons who are 
too young or too old, poor, with criminal records, etc.); 
•  origin of the possession of the company assets and "history" of the company and 
its  directors.  In  this  case  it  is  necessary,  for  example,  to  check  whether the 
company structure has emerged from  another phoenix company (whose name or 
trade name has simply been changed) or whether directors, managers, etc.  have 
been involved in previous fraud cases; 
16  The SCAF fraud study demonstrated that a good system for recording fraud information is an essential 
tool which is  very important for analysing the operation of the system itself,  and  for  evaluating the 
reasons  for  fraud.  The heterogeneous structure of national recording  systems  means  that  it  is  very 
difficult to obtain a general picture of  the fraud situation in the Community. 
17  In the two cases referred to above, the high level of company activities, although recent and conducted 
over a short period, may be real but stimulated by the increased competitiveness obtained throughout 
the  commercial chain because of the  improper VAT advantages  (reduction  in  cost prices  and  sales 
prices). 
9 •  applications  for  large  VAT repayments,  in  particular when  the  applicant  is  an 
exporter or is supplying goods within the Community. 
The availability of  several sources of intelligence and their exploitation by computer 
is  of paramount importance in this area18  and most of the national administrations 
possess  and/or  are  developing  technical  equipment  and  the  necessary  computer 
programmes.19  All  these data have to  be recorded  in  appropriate data banks and 
compared in order to determine the trends in sectors and fraud risk indicators. Some 
Member States  have  set  up  tax  intelligence  departments  which  collect  all 
information possible from any available source (from the data held by govenunent 
bodies to anonymous calls) and centralise it in a single department which examines, 
evaluates, sorts, stores and distributes it. 
Some Member States have set up  special information networks which concentrate 
on  tracking traders  involved in  earlier  frauds,  information about which is  widely 
disseminated ~hroughout the national tax administration.  One Member State ·has set 
up a system which assigns to persons previously involved in certain frauds a unique 
identification  number  under  which  all  relevant  information  concerning  their 
business and professional activities  is  recorded.  Other data bases relate  to  firms 
which  have  issued  or  used  falsified  invoices,  and  fictitious  companies  created 
explicitly for fraudulent purposes. 
The  targeting  of  inspections  on  the  basis  of  certain  parameters  should  be 
supplemented by random audits.  As  a result,  first,  the validi.ty of the criteria used 
would be verified and  enhanced and,  second, taxable persons  would not feel  that 
they were protected from  inspection merely because they were "artificially" outside 
the risk parameters. 
The Commission considers that the basic elements of a risk analysis system which 
can ensure the effectiveness of  control are therefore: 
•  the development of and rapid access to  all sources of relevant information, 
from  tax and non-tax sources, so that they can be collected, exploited and 
disseminated; 
•  a specialised department to analyse and refine the information; 
•  the  provision  to  all  operational  and  control  departments of risk analysis 
systems and warning systems on known or suspected fraud, so that potential 
risk traders can be kept under rapid and permanent surveillance; 
•  the maintenance of an appropriate percentage of random audits. 
18  This need was made very clear at  the joint OECD/HM Customs &  Excise Conference "Information 
and intelligence systems in the field of indirect taxes", Gatwick, United Kingdom, 17-19 March 1997. 
The  SCAF  study  confirms  the  usefulness  of such  external  intelligence:  cooperation  with  other 
administrations or departments (national or foreign)  for  purposes of tax  control  was  indicated in  a 
quarter of the cases. 
19  The conclusions of the  Malmo Matthaeus Tax seminar leave  no doubt as  to  the  fact  that computer 
audit techniques will become increasingly important for the detection of fraud. 
10 3.3.2  Ways ofpreventingfraud 
The  Member States  are  devoting  increasing  attention  to  fraud  prevention  by the 
systematic collection of data which can be used to  establish fraud  risk evaluation 
indicators. 
The registration of a new taxable person20  is  an  important moment for  prevention 
since it provides an opportunity for establishing initial contact with traders to inform 
them of their obligations,  to  collect  important  information  for  the  data bases  on 
taxable persons and to complete the risk analysis.  The population of  European firms 
is  very varied and volatile because it  is  mainly composed of frequently changing, 
very  small  units,  which  require  close  and  constant  monitoring  from  the 
administrations. 
Depending on the Member State, registration can give rise to  systematic controls or 
just to information visits.  Some Member States make "educational visits" to advise 
newly  established  traders  of their  rights  and  obligations,  and  also  to  assess  the 
potential tax at risk. 
In  general  the  data  recorded  is  electronically  available  and  accessible  to  all  the 
national  offices,  but  the  registration  procedures  and  information  requested  vary 
widely according to the Member States, in particular as regards the amount and type 
of  particulars. 
The  preventive  role  of registration  may  become  crucial  in  cases  of fraudulent 
schemes based on phoenix companies.  In such cases, registration may help to make 
it mQre difficult to create and use this type of company.  Registration can be made 
subject to the payment of  a security, in particular in cases where the authorities have 
doubts as to whether activities are genuine, or a higher minimum amount of  starting 
capital can be required; in the case of contrived bankruptcies, directors who, in the 
past, have wound up  their companies on one or more occasions may face  stricter 
conditions under common law for setting up  a new company, such as the provision 
of  a guarantee. 
Some  Member States  require  the  provision  of minimum  information  on  their 
activities from inactive companies whereas other States have them deleted from the 
register. 
The Member States who implement such measures (not always permitted by law) 
nevertheless stress the inherent risks they involve for the free creation of  businesses 
and the fact ·that too strict a registration system would deter traders from leaving the 
underground economy. 
A further key aspect of VAT fraud  prevention is  careful checking of VAT refund 
applications, not only in the case of  new taxpayers but also for all other VAT refund 
claims.  One Member State has developed a strategy for checking the entire chain of 
enterprises back to  the initial phase where a substantial amount of deductible VAT 
is  claimed.  The  taxpayer  in  question  is  asked  to  produce  invoices,  which  are 
checked  by  computer  to  establish  whether  the  traders  who  issued  them  are 
20  These  arguments  were  developed  and  expanded  at  the  Matthaeus  Tax  Seminar "Registration  and 
deregistration" held in Athens in June 1997. 
11 registered.  If a non-registered  trader  is  discovered,  an  inspection  visit  aimed  at 
acquiring further information is carried out. 
The Commission therefore stresses that: 
•  with  a  view  to  making control more effective,  the  registration  of taxable 
persons  is  important for  voluntary  compliance  and in  order to  improve 
prevention, and is a key element in risk analysis. 
•  a system of checking the chain of companies or transactions be used to detect 
any improper VAT refund claims. 
3.4  Control and investigation methods 
3. 4.1  Control techniques 
As  a rule,  the  purpose of control is  to  check whether the tax  has been accurately 
assessed, and whether the activity conducted corresponds to the one which has been 
declared.  This involves a range of research on compliance with legal obligations 
(invoicing, deduction, registration, keeping of accounts, returns, payment, etc.) and 
checks  on  whether  the  accounts  correspond  to  economic  reality  (verification  of 
stocks, did the transactions recorded really exist? do they really have anything to do 
with the taxable person's activity? do sales match productive capacity? etc.). 
Techniques may be based on internal research (monitoring of compliance with tax 
obligations, checking accounts, examining the conditions in which the firm is run, 
etc.). and external research, which is based on the use of any information available 
elsewhere than in  the firm itself so as to be able to check whether the real activity 
corresponds with the one recorded in the accounts.  For example, the cross-checking 
of invoices  with  customers/suppliers  or with  public  or private bodies  (see  point 
3.4.4.) is  an external technique which is widely used because of its effectiveness in 
detecting falsified  invoices, the abuse of the right to  deduct and the suppression of 
the tax on sales. 
The relationship between the two types of research and their content and direction 
depends on the situation found  in each case, but first  and  foremost it  is connected 
with the nature of the  taxable person under examination, namely whether he is  a 
"true taxable  person"  or a  "false taxable  person"  that  was  created with  the  sole 
purpose of committing fraud.  A concealment of activity cannot be detected just by 
examining  accounts  and  returns  (possibly)  signed,  or  by  internal  research  on  a 
structure which is  virtually non-existent.  In  this case inspectors are  faced  with a 
much more vague and  indefinite reality (no registered office or no  fixed  place of 
business, no  accounts, difficulty in finding the real people in charge/directors, etc.) 
which becomes more difficult to reconstruct and to verify after the event, i.e. after a 
lapse of time. 
Tax audits have proved to  be the most effective procedure for observing and really 
verifying  the  genuineness  of the  taxable  person  and  for  comparing  this  with 
accounting  documents.  It  becomes  indispensable  to  verify  the  actual  situation 
directly whenever control requires the  verification of stocks or flows of goods (in 
particular to  establish the turnover of retail businesses whose takings are mainly in 
the form  of  cash).  According to the experience of one Member State, the yield from 
documentary control is half that from tax audits, particularly in the case of VAT. 
12 The checking of invoices is one of  the priority controls: the invoice is one of  the key 
elements in  the  accounts,  representing  the  formal  proof of activity  and  the  basis 
underlying the accounts.  A thorough analysis of this aspect21 shows the desirability 
of concentrating  on  forms  of controlling  selected  invoices  (on  the  basis  of risk 
analysis or other criteria) instead of  the systematic control of  all invoices. 
One  Member State  has  experimented  with  a  new  form  of control  designed  to 
monitor the degree of compliance with tax obligations by on-site observation:  the 
business is informed of  an impending control visit (but not of  the exact date), and on 
arrival at  the trader's premises the controllers collect several  types of information 
(including data on employees) which will later be compared with that shown in the 
periodic returns.  The likelihood of irregularities can thus be assessed and prompt 
action can be taken.  The results obtained by this technique are reflected in the fact 
that such visits now comprise 10% of  all visits to taxable persons. 
Several Member States have developed specific VAT controls based on rapid and 
immediate  visits;  others  pay  prompt attention to  the control  of companies  which 
trade over a short period. 
Most  of  the  Member States  are  making  increased  use  of  intra-Community 
cooperation.22  Directive 771799/EEC  on mutual assistance and Regulation (EEC) 
No  218/92  on  cooperation  offer  a  variety  of possibilities  for  exchanges  and 
information:  assistance  on  request,  spontaneous  or  automatic,  interrogating  the 
VIES  system  and  "Article  5"  requests  (requests  for  information  on  specific 
transactions),  and  direct  contacts  between  competent  authorities  or  other 
departments delegated by the latter, in cases ofbilateral interest. 
In conclusion, the Commission suggests that: 
•  preference  should  be  given  to  control  procedures  based  on  on-site 
observation  because  they  have  proved  more  effective  for  a  full  and 
exhaustive  assessment  of  the  activity  really  carried  on  by  the  taxable 
persons; 
•  control procedures should be flexible enough to adapt to the various control 
requirements, so that specific VAT problems can be dealt with immediately 
and rapidly; 
•  systematic  and  increased  use  be  made of the  opportunities  provided  by 
current legislation on administrative cooperation between Member States. 
3.4.2  Sectoral approach 
Some Member States have developed specific control programmes and methods based on 
a sectoral approach .. They vary according to a number of factors, such as the sector being 
21  Matthaeus Tax seminar, "Invoice control and invoice-related fraud", Madrid, December 1996. 
22  See  the  Commission's  first  two  reports  pursuant  to  Article  14  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  218/92 
[COM (94 )262 final, of 23 June 1994 and COM(96) 681  final, 8 January 1997]. 
13 controlled, the size of the finn and the nature of the taxable person (industry, agriculture, 
liberal profession). 
Experience shows that such an approach: 
•  enables  inspectors  to  acquire  a  thorough knowledge of the  machinery and  specific 
features of the sector and, therefore, the latest developments and trends in fraud;  the 
control procedures are particularly well-adapted and refined; 
•  makes it easier to collect specific data for risk analysis and prevention purposes and, at 
the  same time,  to  check  the  validity  of previous  analyses  and  the  results  already 
obtained; 
•  enables stricter relations to  be established between the  representatives of the sector 
and the administration. 
This approach enabled one Member State to  uncover 30% more irregularities in the car 
industry in the 1994-95 period. 
To  assist  with these measures,  some  Member States  issue  audit  guides,  handbooks or 
monographs summarising and explaining current practices in the sector which may be of 
interest  to  investigators:  market  trends,  standard  margins,  modus  operandi,  specific 
accounting  documents,  output,  working  procedures,  the  percentage  of wastage,  etc. 
These  guides  and  handbooks  should  be  available  on-line  and  constantly  updated  to 
include the latest developments.  Some Member States organise training courses or issue 
newsletters to keep their control departments up-to-date. 
Some very important information requiring distribution relates to  the practical means of 
detecting certain types of fraud, e.g.: 
•  indicators which have made it possible to  identify false invoices {poor-quality paper, 
vague  details  in  addresses,  telephone  numbers,  etc.,  photocopied  or  hand-written 
invoices, constant use ofround figures, etc.); 
•  analyses of the flow of goods and cash in order to check for the incorrect application 
of VAT rates in the case of large retailers. 
Increasing use is  being made of specialist units to  carry out controls on account of the 
specific  characteristics  of the  taxable  persons  operating  in  these  areas.  Such  units 
endeavour,  in  collaboration with  all  the  departments  concerned,  to  control  the  entire 
commercial chain concerned. 
If controls on very large firms  and/or multinationals are to  be efficient, administrations 
must try to  adapt their procedures to  the  real  situation prevailing in these circles.  The 
complexity of company structures (which are often spread out over a number of sites and 
in  several  Member States) and of their  accounting and  financial-control  systems,  their 
degree  of cornputerisation,  the  amount  of tax  involved  and  the  scale  on  which  tax 
avoidance is perpetrated in addition to  fraud in the strict sense of the term have led some 
Member States  to  set  up  special  departments  or  programmes  to  monitor  firms 
continuously. 
Some Member States have developed specific techniques for detecting fraud in individual 
sectors, such as  "test-eating" in the catering trade. 
14 In  the  light of experience of employing the sectoral approach, the Commission calls on 
Member States to: 
•  develop and reinforce the sectoral approach; 
•  draw up and widely distribute audit guides and handbooks; 
•  exchange details of experience in this area; 
•  develop  more specialist techniques for  detecting  fraud, especially in  the  more 
complex sectors. 
3.4.3  Powers of  control 
The powers of the  inspection departments,  which  are  in  principle strictly delimited in 
order to safeguard the rights of taxpayers, vary extremely widely from one Member State 
to another. 
Conducting searches for accounting documents not made available is, for example, often 
prohibited; access to  a private domicile generally requires  the  prior sanction of a legal 
authority;  unannounced  visits  are  normally  authorised  only  if there  are  grounds  for 
suspecting fraud and, in some Member States, are not allowed under any circumstances. 
It is important that the national administrations should have the legal power to cany. out 
certain control methods and, in particular, extensive controls providing them with access 
to  subsidiary  records  (documentation  which  is  not  of a  strictly  fiscal  or  accounting 
nature)  and  to  certain  factual  information  and  allowing  them  to  observe  operating 
conditions: such information, when it may be sought and used, often provides a basis for 
checking  the  accuracy  of the  official  accounts  (contracts,  a  diary  in  which  table 
reservations  or  appointments  with  suppliers/customers  are  logged,  records  of 
maintenance work carried out on machinery and motor vehicles, etc.). 
Estimated  assessments  may  be  made  only  when  a  firm  has  not  produced  certain 
documents or filed tax returns and it is then up to the firm  to show that the assessment is 
wrong or too high. 
Certain  administrations  may  also  send  out  questionnaires,  which  taxable  persons  are 
obliged to answer; copies of documents may also have to  be produced.  This option is 
often used to  carry out extensive cross-checks without deploying or shifting important 
control resources. 
The question of  control powers is a very delicate matter, because it must strike the correct 
balance between administrations and taxpayers. 
The Commission considers as priorities in this context: 
•  striking  the  optimum  balance  between  control  requirements  and  the 
safeguarding of traders' rights; 
•  adapting control  powers  in  such  a  way  that they  are reinforced  to  the extent 
demanded  by  suspicions  of fraud  or  by  the  seriousness  of  a  presumed  or 
recorded fraud. 
15 3.4.4  Investigations into organisedfraud 
Where controls do not involve an actual taxable person, as is often the case with carousel 
frauds  and  fraudulent  arrangements,  detection  of the  fraud  often  requires  complex, 
extensive investigations in order to reconstruct a situation which is not at all apparent. 
Most Member States express concern about such practices as  carousel  fraud  and bogus 
companies since they are generally planned and carried out by entire organisations whose 
sole  purpose  is  tax  fraud  and  which  are  often  linked  to  fraud  in  other  fields  (direct 
taxation)  or  other  kinds  of  criminal  activity  (money  laundering,  counterfeiting, 
smuggling, etc.). 
The  extraordinary  difficulties  involved  in  carrying  out controls  in  this  context  derive 
mainly from the fact that: 
•  the bogus companies used are often established in another Member State or in a third 
country, which makes it  more difficult to  carry out controls and check on their real 
nature;  it  also  enables  them  to  benefit  from  exemption  from  VAT  in  the  case  of 
intra-Community supplies and exports.  A classic example is  the creation in  another 
Member State  or  third  country  of fictitious  taxable  persons  who  are  the  declared 
consignees of tax-free goods which never actually leave the Member State of origin: 
this enables the seller to deduct the input tax paid and to acquire tax-free goods which 
he can resell on the black market; 
•  bogus companies, which are generally set up in the form of small and medium-sized 
enterprises  or  liaison  offices  of  foreign  undertakings,  use  the  simplified  tax 
arrangements introduced by  most Member States for  small businesses.  As a  result, 
they  are  subject to  less  stringent  fiscal  or  legal  obligations,  which  makes  it  more 
difficult  for  the  national  tax  administrations  to  keep  tabs  on  them.23  This  is 
particularly true when such companies fail to register; 
•  transactions are often split into a large number of  smaller transactions which are not in 
themselves of  interest in risk-analysis terms; 
•  finally, in addition to locating transactions in a number of different countries in tum, 
the commercial chains involve a large number of companies or intermediaries with an 
extremely short lifespan or period of  actual activity. 
In such a set-up, everything is designed to appear normal but, at the same time, to avoid 
leaving any trace: taxable persons spring up and disappear quickly, change their business 
name frequently, relocate within a short time, have no proper structure and keep either no 
accounts at all or only very sketchy and simplified accounts.  A prompt and immediate 
clampdown on such fraudulent networks, the seizure of as much evidence as possible and 
identification of the real perpetrators is essential both to justify claims of  back tax and for 
its actual recovery. 
At  intra-Community level,  operational departments have on several  occasions24  argued 
for exchange and communication systems that are swift, direct, informal and unhampered 
by red tape. 
23  !-"or  example,  SMEs  are  often  subject  to  a  simplified  tax  regime  whereby  declarations  are  less 
detailed and need not be submitted at such frequent mtervals. 
24  At the following meet111gs  among others: I lelsinki, SCAf-',  European Conferences of VAT Inspectors, 
\bttheu-; Tax Semin~w;, OI:CD/1 I\1 C'&F. 
16 It is of paramount importance that tax administrations should have access to data held by 
public or private bodies25 and to information collected from suppliers or customers of the 
firm concerned (invoices for goods purchased, contracts signed with the firm, etc.) if  they 
are to detect concealed activities.  Most Member States have, therefore, made it easier for 
their  tax  administrations  to  gain  access  to  such  information,  which  is  subsequently 
cross-checked with the firm's tax file. 
In some Member States,  this  data can be obtained through on-line connections to  data 
bases. 
By way of  conclusion, the Commission: 
•  emphasises  that success  in  investigating  these  types  of fraud  depends  on  the 
immediate  detection  of the  fraudulent  scheme  and,  above  all,  in  the  prompt 
implementation of stricter preventive measures; 
•  in view of the international and intra-Community character of this type of fraud 
and  in  order  to  prevent  any  escalation  in  the  situation,  it  calls  upon  the 
Member States to step up their cooperation in this area and to adopt the requisite 
measures. 
3.5  Recovery 
Effective  recovery  procedures  to  ensure  that  the  tax  owed is  collected are  the  natural 
corollary of controls.  The Second Report dealt with the problems deriving from  VAT 
debt  management  and  made  a  number  of recommendations  in  this  connection  (see 
Chapter 4 and 6.2(6)). 
As indicated above, in cases of fraud; the administrations run the risk that the taxpayer 
will attempt to avoid paying his VAT debt and to remove goods which could be seized if 
the debt is enforced.  This requires special attention and swifter intervention on the part 
of the  administrations.  This  report  therefore  refers  in  particular  to  the  obstacles 
encountered by Member States in enforcing VAT claims. 
An  elementary  precondition  for  enforcing  a  claim  efficiently  and  swiftly  is  that  the 
administrations should have adequate legal powers, particularly for  obtaining a distraint 
order.  In  this  connection,  Member States  may,  in  general,  levy  a  distraint  on  all  the 
defaulter's  goods  and  chattels.  However,  this· process  sometimes  comes  up  against 
obstacles of  a legal or practical nature (e.g. difficulty in identifying distrainable goods or 
in obtaining the information necessary to enforce recovery, particularly where the taxable 
person's  distrainable  liquid  assets  are  concerned).  While  some  Member States 
experience  major  problems  in  obtaining  information  on  the  existence  of the  taxable 
person's bank accounts and the money contained therein, others can obtain a distraint 
25  Useful  information  generally  relates  to  contracts  for  telephone,  fax  and  electricity  supplies, 
car-registration,  chambers  of  commerce,  customs,  public  records  departments,  professional 
associations and any other data specific to  individual sectors.  In the case of the building industry, for 
example, information held by bodies responsible for  issuing building permits or that contained in land 
or mortgage registers may prove useful. 
17 order on  the  basis  of agreements  with  the  banking  organisations.  It should  also  be 
pointed out that the lack of harmonisation of national legislation in this area is one of the 
main reasons why Member States make limited use of (cross-border) mutual assistance 
for recovery purposes.26 
To  be  effective, enforced recovery measures must be initiated promptly.  However, the 
Commission has noted that in many Member States fairly  long periods elapse between 
assessment of  the tax and its recovery. This is partly due to the fact that the tax demand is 
not  normally  directly  enforceable  on  the  due  date  if the  tax  is  not  paid  and  a  new 
document must therefore be drawn up to initiate enforced recovery.  If  the debtor appeals 
against the enforcement order, the delay may be even longer. 
Where recovery procedures are suspended as the result of an appeal, Member States do 
not always make a sufficient effort to  prevent defaults on payment (e.g.  by demanding 
securities or applying  precautionary measures) by fraudsters,  despite the major risk of 
default which they represent. Similarly, when the appeal does not succeed or is obviously 
unjustified, penalty interest running from  the date on which the tax would normally be 
due and cancelling out the unwarranted financial advantage derived by the debtor is not 
always demanded. 
Some Member States are  unable to  take precautionary recovery measures based on  an 
estimate of  the tax ultimately due, even in cases of  tax fraud. 
The cumbersome enforced recovery procedure may sometimes be avoided by offsetting 
the tax due against public benefits payable to the taxable person.  In practice, however, 
this measure, though effective, is often limited to debts and claims managed by the same 
administration since there  is  no  systematic  exchange of information between different 
administrations. 
Finally,  where  it  is  implemented,  mutual  assistance  on  recovery  comes  up  against  a 
number of difficultie.s, mainly as a result of the fact that only a few  Member States give 
other Member States' claims the same priority as their own. 
26  See  the  Commission's  Second  Article 14  Report  presented  in  accordance  with  Council 
Regulation 218/92 (COM(96) 681  final of 8 January 1997, p. 5).  The Report identifies a whole series 
of obstacles  to  assistance  in  the  recovery  of claims:  lack  of harmonisation  of legal  or  practical 
restrictions on distraint procedures, rules making it possible to extend the responsibility for recovering 
claims to  the managers of debtor companies, time-limits for  recovery, rules on banking secrecy, etc. 
Proposals  aimed  at  remedying  this  unsatisfactory  situation  are  currently  being  prepared  by  the 
Commission,  which  will  shortly  be  proposing  amendments  to  Council  Directive 76/308/EEC  on 
mutual assistance for the recovery of claims. 
18 By way of  conclusion, the Commission emphasises the importance of: 
•  ensuring  that  the  recovery  authorities  have  adequate  means  (information, 
offsetting against other debts, inter-departmental cooperation, data bases, etc.) to 
recover the tax swiftly; 
•  organising recovery action through the thorough computerisation of procedures, 
so  that the  period that elapses  between  assessment of the debt and enforced 
recovery can be reduced; 
•  preventing defaults on the payment of VAT debts more effectively by applying 
precautionary  measures,  including  precautionary  recovery,  by  demanding 
securities and charging penalty interest when payment of the VAT debt has been 
delayed by an unjustified appeal; 
•  treating other Member States' VAT claims in the same way as domestic claims. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
Article 12  of Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1553/89 requires the Commission to 
consider with the  Member States  what  improvements can  be  made to  their VAT 
procedures to enhance their effectiveness.  The Commission has to draw up a report 
on these improvements every three years. 
This consideration of possible improvements to  VAT controls has to be based on a 
common  analysis  of the  problems  and  possible  solutions.  In  Chapter 2,  the 
Commission analyses  the  common problems  facing  the  Member States regarding 
VAT controls.  In Chapter 3,  it  sets out its  view of the best way to  tackle fraud, 
drawing on acquired understanding of the problem and combining the best practices 
identified by Member States and communicated to the Commission. 
Many of these recommendations have already been implemented by a number of 
Member States.  However,  much  work  has  still  to  be  done.  The  Commission 
considers that all the Member States should examine the recommendations set out in 
the report, since they would enable them to improve VAT controls. 
These recommendations are based on the detem1ination to  optimise compliance by 
taxpayers with their obligations and to prevent fraud through an effective inspection 
strategy based on the application of risk analysis to the selection of the taxpayers to 
be inspected.  Such a strategy calls for immediate access to important information 
and for the use of appropriate and flexible controls and recovery methods designed 
to  prevent tax  fraud.  Improved expertise in  the  fraud  field,  appropriate use of the 
powers  of  law  enforcement  authorities,  and  greater  cooperation  between 
Member States will be essential if fraud  is to  be countered.  The Commission will 
make  its  contribution  through  programmes  such  as  Fiscalis  (e.g.  by  pooling 
experience of measures taken to combat fraud)  and other committees involving the 
Member States (e.g. SCAF). 
Over the next three years, the Commission intends to  examine with the competent 
authorities in each Member State how the effectiveness of VAT control procedures 
might be improved.  To that end, it will study, together with each Member State in 
turn,  all  the  control  procedures  employed  by  them.  The  analysis  and 
recommendations made in  this report will  serve as  a basis for  this joint assessment 
ofpotential improvements.  The fourth report will set out the findings of that study. 
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